Defining the Agenda for Serious Tort Reform by Cortese, Alfred W., Jr. & Riemer, Yosef J.
Defining the Agenda for Serious Tort
Reform
ALFRED W. CORTESE, JR.*
YOSEF J. RIEMER**
A reply To Professor Sugarman.
THE NEED FOR IMMEDIATE REFORM
After a thoughtful and comprehensive review of the current tort
system, Professor Stephen D. Sugarman concludes that "serious re-
forms" are necessary to restore fairness and reason to our system of
civil justice. Lawyers for Civil Justice' agrees.
As Professor Sugarman ably demonstrates, the tort system of the
1980s has come to resemble a lottery,2 in which a few lucky litigants
recover enormous windfalls and others are not even compensated for
out-of-pocket losses.3 Increases in damage awards have far outstrip-
ped the inflation rate and they rationally relate less and less to the
injuries involved and defendants' responsibility for those injuries.
Many of the deficiencies Professor Sugarman identifies resulted
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i. Lawyers for Civil Justice is a coalition of corporations, individuals and associa-
tions interested in reducing unnecessary litigation costs arising from the abuse of existing
litigation procedures and statutes.
2. Sugarman, Serious Tort Law Reform, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 795 (1987).
3. For example, according to a Rand Corporation study, cases with million dollar
awards accounted for only 8% of all money awarded in San Francisco courts in the
1960s. By the early 1970s, 30% of all money awarded to plaintiffs was received in cases
with verdicts over one million dollars. By the late 1970s, the figure had reached almost
50%. In the 1980s it had increased to almost 66%. G. SHUBERT, CHANGES IN THE TORT
SYSTEM: HELPING INFORM THE POLICY DEBATE 2 (Rand Corp. Inst. for Civ. Just. 1986).
from revolutionary judicial extensions of tort law. Consider, for ex-
ample, the legal prerequisite for imposing liability. Historically, tort
law was based on the notion of fault: a defendant could only be re-
quired to pay damages if the plaintiff established that his injury re-
sulted from defendant's wrongful conduct. More recently, courts
have developed principles holding defendants liable in the absence of
any finding of fault. A second area in which courts have rewritten
the law of torts concerns joint and several liability. Originally, that
doctrine allowed a court to impose liability on one defendant for the
actions of another defendant only if the two defendants had engaged
in concerted action against the plaintiff. More recently, courts have
applied joint liability to make virtually any defendant with the re-
sources to qualify as a "deep pocket" liable for damages caused by
other defendants, regardless of the absence of concerted action.5
The consequences engendered by those and other radical changes
in tort law became most visible in recent years as state and local
governments, businesses, and professionals experienced drastic in-
creases in premiums for liability insurance. 6 As a result of these in-
creases and insurers' reluctance to offer coverage in a growing num-
ber of fields perceived to have high risks because of the litigation
explosion, numerous entities were forced to operate without insur-
ance or with only limited coverage. 7
As Professor Sugarman indicates, however, the problems posed by
changes in traditional tort principles transcend the recent difficulties
regarding liability insurance.8 Ultimately the problem that must be
addressed is not insurance reform, but the abiding need to restore
fairness to the civil justice system.
Having succeeded in defining the problem, Professor Sugarman
turns to advancing his own recommended solutions. Three of his rec-
ommendations are especially noteworthy and deserving of support: 1)
assigning to judges rather than jurors the responsibility to determine
the propriety of an award of punitive damages;9 2) placing limits on
awards for noneconomic losses, such as pain and suffering awards; 10
4. See, e.g., Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539
(1982).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 31-47.
6. A 1986 Justice Department report surveying the effect of the insurance crisis
on various sectors of the U.S. economy found municipalities experiencing premium in-
creases of as much as 400% architects and engineers paying 200% to 300% more, and
manufacturers experiencing increases of 40% to 300%. REPORT OF THE TORT POLICY
WORKING GROUP ON THE CAUSES, EXTENT AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT
CRISIS IN INSURANCE AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY 8-12 (1986) [hereinafter DOJ
REPORT]
7. Id. at 14-15, 45-52.
8. See Sugarman, supra note 2.
9. Id. at 830.
10. Id at 825.
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and 3) reform of the collateral source rule." Lawyers for Civil Jus-
tice supports each of these initiatives.
Punitive Damages
In recent years there has been an enormous surge in the number
and size of punitive damage awards. For example, although only one
reported appellate decision before 1970 upheld an award of punitive
damages in a product liability action, appellate courts now regularly
affirm awards in excess of $1 million in such cases.12 As one com-
mentator has concluded, punitive damages are now "awarded in
cases in which liability of any sort would have been almost out of the
question merely fifteen years ago."13 The prospect of a large award
of punitive damages has been called "the pot of gold at the end of
the rainbow . . . that motivates plaintiffs and their counsel to go to
trial" and makes it more difficult to settle cases. 4
To restore rationality to the law of punitive damages, judges
should take a greater role in such determinations. Courts are better
equipped than jurors, for example, to select an amount that will
serve the purposes of a punitive award without unduly punishing a
particular defendant. This is especially true in cases involving corpo-
rate defendants, cases in which jurors have difficulty evaluating the
wealth of institutional manufacturers or product sellers and may be
biased against any defendant perceived to have substantial re-
sources.1 Moreover, this change would ensure that jurors do not
consider evidence of a defendant's financial position - evidence
which is relevant to determining the amount of punitive damages but
irrelevant and prejudicial in deciding the threshold question of liabil-
11. Id at 819.
12. See Birnbaum & Wheeler, Punitive-Damages Law Paves Way for Massive
Design-Defect Awards, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 17, 1986, at 40, col. 1; Wheeler, The Constitu-
tional Case for Reforming Punitive Damages Procedures, 69 VA. L. REV. 269, 271 n.6
(1983).
Similarly, a Rand Corporation study of all types of litigation in Cook County, Illinois,
found that the total amount of punitive damage awards had increased by 700% during
the 1980s. Product Liability Voluntary Claims and Uniform Standards Act: Hearings
on S. 1999 Before the Senate Subcommittee on the Consumer of the Committee on
Commerce, Science and Transportation, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 82 (1986) (statement of
Deborah R. Hensler, The Institute for Civil Justice, Rand Corporation).
13. Schwartz, Deterrence and Punishment in the Common Law of Punitive Dam-
ages: A Comment, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 133, 133 (1982).
14. Recent Developments in Tort Law Reform, 39 Bus. LAW. 209, 238 (1983)
(comments of A. Whittemore).
15. Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages Against Manufacturers of
Defective Products, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 45-49 (1982).
ity - in deciding whether any punitive damages are warranted."6
Additional reforms also should be enacted to control the spiraling
increases in punitive damage awards. First, the level of proof re-
quired to impose punitive damages should be increased to a showing
of at least "clear and convincing evidence. '17 Second, the substantive
standard governing punitive damages claims should be clarified to
insure that such awards are limited to cases where a defendant's
conduct manifests a malicious and reckless disregard for the safety
of those persons who might be harmed and constitutes an extreme
departure from accepted standards of conduct. Is Finally, legislatures
and courts should require that punitive damage awards be reasona-
bly related to the amount of actual damages suffered.19 Although
Professor Sugarman may be correct in submitting that these changes
may prove to have less significance than assigning judges the pri-
mary role in making punitive damage determinations, 20 these steps
are worthwhile reforms nonetheless.
Noneconomic Damages
The second factor contributing most heavily to the dramatic in-
crease in the size of jury awards is the rapid escalation in awards for
noneconomic damages. Although intended to be compensatory,
damages for pain and suffering are not compensation in any ordinary sense
that they make the plaintiff whole or replace what has been lost, since the
damages are not pecuniary and since there is no market in pain and suffer-
ing by which the damages could be estimated. 1
In the absence of any objective standard that jurors can utilize to
make such awards and that courts can employ in assessing jury ver-
dicts, jurors have virtually unbridled discretion to award whatever
amount they wish.2 Studies of trends in jury verdicts indicate that
16. See S. REP. No. 476, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. at 56-57 (1984).
17. A number of jurisdictions have adopted this reform by statute or judicial deci-
sion. See, e.g., D&T Sanitation, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins..Co., 443 N.E.2d
1207 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983); Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 294 N.W.2d
437 (1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20 (West Supp. 1983); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.925
(1981).
18. Current standards utilized by many courts are so vague that a defendant can
be required to pay punitive damages in virtually any case in which a design defect is
found. See generally Birnbaum and Wheeler, supra note 12.
19. Although some jurisdictions recognize this requirement, many do not. Com-
pare Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. 357, 377 (E.D. Pa. 1982), affd,
760 F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1985), with Carroll Kenworth Truck Sales, Inc. v. Leach, 396 So.
2d 1044, 1046 (Ala. 1981). Absent such a requirement, virtually any case can give rise
to multi-million dollar exposure. For example, in Lavoie v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co.,
470 So. 2d 1060 (Ala. 1984), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 106 S. Ct. 1580
(1986), an insurance company which failed to pay a $1650.22 bill was initially ordered
to pay $3.5 million in punitive damages.
20. Sugarman, supra note 2, at 833-34.
21. D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 545 (1973).
22. 4 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS, 563-64 (2d ed. 1986).
[VOL. 24: 903. 1987] Defining the Agenda
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
in recent years jurors have awarded dramatically larger amounts for
pain and suffering. 3 The open-ended nature of noneconomic dam-
ages creates vast unpredictability in the tort system and presents a
significant obstacle in the settlement process and in the setting of
insurance rates.
Recognizing the problems posed by open-ended liability for
noneconomic damages, a number of state legislatures recently have
enacted legislation placing limitations on such damage awards in all
tort actions.24 Similarly, California enacted legislation limiting the
amount of noneconomic damages that can be awarded in medical
malpractice cases to $250,000.25 Lawyers for Civil Justice supports
legislation to place reasonable limits on noneconomic damages in all
personal injury cases. Because of the lack of objective standards by
which noneconomic damages might be measured, it is entirely appro-
priate for legislatures to set bounds by statute within which juries
can make such awards. Whether limits are established as a fixed
amount per injury or occurrence, as Professor Sugarman recom-
mends,28 or tied to economic losses by allowing a specified percent-
age of such damages, ceilings on recovery of noneconomic losses
would assure that such damages are more closely related to actual
losses and that equity among claimants is maintained.
Collateral Source Rule
A third element of a sound tort reform program is modification of
the collateral source rule. That rule prohibits judges and juries from
receiving evidence that a plaintiff in a tort action has already re-
ceived compensation for injuries claimed in the litigation from other
sources. It thus permits a plaintiff to obtain a windfall of double or
triple recovery for the same loss. For example, a plaintiff in a tort
action who has already been "paid his salary . . . during disability,
23. As noted in a Justice Department report, the percentage rate of increase for
large verdicts has been far higher than for small or medium size verdicts. DOJ REPORT,
supra note 6, at 39. The most significant factor distinguishing large verdicts from small
or medium-sized verdicts is that large verdicts consist of disproportionately higher
amounts for noneconomic damages. Id. For example, one study of Florida malpractice
cases found that noneconomic damages represent only 27% of awards between $100,000
and $200,000, while the noneconomic share increases to 54% for awards above $600,000.
H. MANNE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE POLICY GUIDEBOOK 138-39 (1985).
24. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.010 (1986); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102.5
(1986); FLA. STAT. § 768.80 (1986); HAW. REV. STAT. § 663 (1986); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 227.13 (1986); WASH. REV. CODE § 301 (1986).
25. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West 1986).
26. Sugarman, supra note 2, at 825.
or had his medical expenses or other losses paid for by another, or
out of the proceeds of an accident or other insurance policy," may
still recover full damages for these same items from a defendant who
is liable for the injury. 7
The fundamental purpose of the tort system is to compensate
plaintiffs for their losses in order to make them whole - neither
better nor worse off than if the loss had not occurred. By permitting
a claimant who has already received workers' compensation, pay-
ments from disability and medical insurance, or other collateral
sources to receive an award for these same losses in court, the rule
allows the plaintiff to receive more than full compensation. The cost
of this double payment is passed on to consumers in the form of
higher prices for products, higher taxes, and higher insurance
premiums.
Stripped of its original rationales by developments in the law,28
the rule operates as a form of punishment by requiring some defend-
ants to pay damages beyond those required to make the plaintiff
whole. Yet, unlike punitive damages, the collateral source rule draws
no distinction among defendants based on the degree of fault: liabil-
ity for these extra damages is determined not by whether the defend-
ant acted intentionally or negligently but rather whether the plaintiff
is eligible for payments from collateral sources. Recognizing this
anomaly, several jurisdictions have moved in recent years to abolish
or limit the rule.2
27. 4 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, supra note 23, § 25.22, at 648-49 (foot-
note omitted).
28. Advocates of the collateral source rule traditionally relied on two rationales.
First, they argued that it was unfair to take collateral sources into account in awarding
damages because those sources were often financed by the claimant himself. Whatever
the validity of this reasoning when the rule operated primarily to shield insurance pay-
ments financed by the claimant's own premiums, it no longer is persuasive in a time
when the vast majority of collateral payments are paid by others. See DOJ REPORT,
supra note 6, at 71.
The second justification frequently offered for the rule centers on notions of fault.
Given a choice between allowing "innocent plaintiffs" or "wrongdoers" to benefit, it is
often said that any windfall should go to the innocent plaintiff. See, e.g., Grayson v.
Williams, 256 F.2d 61, 65 (10th Cir. 1958). This reasoning has been rendered obsolete,
however, by changes in tort law allowing plaintiffs who are at fault to recover damages
and subjecting defendants to liability for conduct that is less and less morally blamewor-
thy. See 4 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, supra note 23, § 25.22 at 656 (footnote
omitted).
29. Florida recently enacted a statute requiring courts to deduct collateral pay-
ments from jury awards. FLA. STAT. § 768.76 (1986). Indiana enacted a statute allowing
admission of evidence of payments from collateral sources financed by employers, such as
workers' compensation or health benefits provided to employees, but retained the rule for
other types of benefits. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-36 (Burns 1986). California has abol-
ished the collateral source rule in negligence actions against health care providers. CAL,
CIv. CODE § 3333.1 (West 1987). See also ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.070 (1986); COLO.
REV. STAT.§ 13-21-111.6 (1986); HAW. REV. STAT. § 663 (1986); MINN. STAT. § 80
(1986).
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Like Professor Sugarman, Lawyers for Civil Justice supports re-
form of the collateral source rule to allow reduction of tort awards to
reflect benefits received for identical losses. Thus, for example, if a
jury awards a plaintiff damages in a tort action for which the plain-
tiff has already obtained compensation from any federal, state, or
employer-financed program providing benefits for such losses, the
judge presiding over the tort case should be required to subtract an
amount representing the collateral payments from the tort award.3"
Joint and Several Liability
Although he touches on many of the leading tort reform proposals,
Professor Sugarman omits consideration of one proposal that has
been the subject of considerable legislative and judicial attention:
modification of joint and several liability principles. As currently ap-
plied in the majority of jurisdictions, that doctrine operates to render
any defendant who is at all responsible for a plaintiff's injury fully
liable for damages attributable to the conduct of other defendants as
well as his own conduct. In practical terms, this means that a plain-
tiff can collect an award from the defendant with the most money -
the so-called "deep pocket" - rather than the defendant with the
greatest culpability.
It is simply unfair to require a partially responsible party to pay
damages caused by others. This inequity is illustrated by any num-
ber of recent cases applying this deep pocket rule.3'
Joint and several liability initially was developed to penalize de-
fendants who conspired to engage in a wrongful act together. As an
early English case explained, "[with] all coming to do an unlawful
act, and of one party, the act of one is the act of all. .. ."' Thus,
where defendants engaged in a "concert of action," each was held
entirely liable for all damages as each was considered equally at
fault.33
Subsequent decisions have expanded this principle beyond its orig-
inal rationale of equal fault by holding defendants individually liable
30. Of course, to insure that defendants in tort actions do not receive an unfair
advantage from this change, any defendant benefiting from such a reduction would lose
any common law lien it might have on the collateral payments.
31. See, e.g., Green, In the Balance: A Lawyer Faces Risks In Deciding to Take
On Costly Damage Suits, Wall St. J., May 23, 1986, at 1, col 1; Granelli, The Attack on
Joint & Several Liability, 71 A.B.A. J. 61 (July 1985).
32. Heydon's Case, 11 Co. Rep. 5, 77 Eng. Rep. 1150 (1613) (quoted in 3 F.
HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, supra note 22, § 10 at 1.
33. See S. REP. No. 422, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1986).
for harm caused by other defendants where a plaintiff is the victim
of independent, separate, but concurring tortious acts of two or more
persons. 4 In other words, this extension of joint and several liability
treats defendants as having acted jointly, even though there is no
cooperative behavior that would make it proper to treat the conduct
of each as the conduct of the others. In contrast, English courts, the
first to impose joint and several liability, have maintained the tradi-
tional common law basis for the doctrine by refusing to recognize
such liability in the absence of concerted action."
Extension of joint and several liability from the realm of concerted
action resulted from a failure to distinguish procedural and substan-
tive considerations. At common law, notions of procedural joinder
and joint and several liability were coterminous: "only those
tortfeasors could be joined as defendants who were jointly and sever-
ally liable under substantive law."'36 As modern procedural reforms
were adopted permitting joinder in a single law suit of all persons
whose conduct may have contributed to a plaintiff's injury, rather
than only those tortfeasors who acted jointly, courts assumed that
joint and several liability should be expanded to reflect the proce-
dural change.3 7 In doing so, these courts failed to recognize that the
procedural innovations were not intended to alter substantive law but
only to promote trial convenience.
38
It is a fundamental principle of our legal system that a person is
held responsible only for the consequences of his own improper ac-
tions. Joint liability dissolves this essential connection between causal
responsibility and liability by allowing a person who is only partially
responsible for a claimant's injury to be held responsible for damages
caused by other defendants. This result is especially troublesome
where the defendant who may pay the judgment is less at fault than
the defendant escaping liability.
The result is even more bizarre in jurisdictions that apply joint
liability principles in conjunction with comparative negligence princi-
ples. Although a plaintiff's own negligence was once an absolute bar
to his recovery in a tort action, the vast majority of jurisdictions .now
have adopted more flexible comparative negligence principles permit-
34. See, e.g., Shows v. Jamison Bedding, Inc., 671 F.2d 927, 929 n.1 (5th Cir.
1982); Buehler v. Whalen, 70 II1. 2d 51, 374 N.E.2d 460 (1977). The one exception
recognized in such cases arises where the independent concurring acts have caused dis-
tinct and separate injuries to the plaintiff. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
433A(1)(a), comment b, illustrations 1, 2 (1965).
35. 1 S. SPEISER, C. KRAUSE & A. GANS, THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 3:7, at
393 (1983).
36. 3 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, supra note 22, § 10.1 at 7 (footnote citing
cases omitted).
37. Id. at 8-10.
38. Id. at 10.
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ting plaintiffs who were partially at fault to recover at least a portion
of their damages.3 9 In these jurisdictions, a minimally responsible
defendant may be held jointly liable for a judgment against multiple
defendants even though he is less responsible for the plaintiff's injury
than the plaintiff.40 Ironically, the shift to comparative negligence
principles was intended to allocate responsibility more fairly and pro-
portionately than an all-or-nothing rule requiring a plaintiff with any
fault to absorb all costs.41 Yet joint liability operates on a similar all-
or-nothing basis to require a defendant with any fault to absorb all
costs - failing to allocate responsibility fairly and proportionately
among defendants.
The joint liability rule results in inclusion of many state and local
governments and corporations as defendants in litigation in which
their involvement is only tangential, in order to provide the plaintiff
with a deep pocket that might subsidize more culpable defendants
less able to pay. 2 Because many governments and corporations are
no longer able to obtain affordable liability insurance, taxpayers and
consumers are often forced to pay the cost of this deep pocket liabil-
ity through higher taxes, reduced services, and higher prices.
The deep pocket rule was a major contributor to the recent insur-
ance crisis. Because insured entities frequently are required to pay
damages attributable to the tortious acts of uninsured codefendants,
liability insurance rates have skyrocketed. Moreover, the possibility
of such liability is a source of tremendous uncertainty for insurers in
setting premiums: because of joint liability, an insurer must calcu-
late not only a rate that reflects the risk of insuring a particular
entity, but also the risk generated by unseen and unknown entities
that might be named as codefendants of the insured entity.43
In recent years the trend of expanding joint liability has been re-
39. See V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 1.1 (1986).
40. A recent report by a task force on tort reform appointed by Massachusetts
Governor Michael S. Dukakis illustrated this point by presenting the following situation
which could arise under Massachusetts principles of joint and several liability and com-
parative negligence: A plaintiff 40% responsible for his own injury sues two defendants
- one who is responsible for 50% of the fault (Defendant A) and another for 10% (De-
fendant B). Under Massachusetts law, the plaintiff could recover from Defendant B 60%
of the damages he suffered even though that defendant was responsible for only 10% of
the fault and is thus less at fault than the plaintiff. LIABILITY IN MASSACHUSETTS: TO-
WARD A FAIRER SYSTEM, REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON LIABILITY IS-
suEs 128-29 (1986).
41. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON
LITIGATION ISSUES 20 (1986).
42. DOJ REPORT, supra note 6, at 64.
43. See S, REP. No. 422, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1986).
versed, and a number of jurisdictions have moved to restore the doc-
trine to its original foundation.4 Several states have adopted statutes
abolishing or restricting joint liability in the absence of true con-
certed action among defendants. 5 In California, a statute limiting
joint liability to a plaintiff's economic losses and rendering the doc-
trine inapplicable to such noneconomic losses as damages for "pain
and suffering" was adopted by referendum."' Several other states
have made similar changes by judicial decision.
Lawyers for Civil Justice supports abolition of joint liability (ex-
cept in instances of concerted action) in order to restore fairness to
the tort system. Joint liability is inequitable because it allows a de-
fendant who is one percent responsible to be required to pay one
hundred percent of plaintiff's damages. Abolition of joint liability
would eliminate this inequity and restore the essential connection be-
tween the degree of causal responsibility and the amount of liability.
Each party - including the plaintiff - should bear responsibility
only for its contribution to an injury. The liability of all parties
should be several only, except where the parties are found to have
engaged in true concerted action.
STRATEGY FOR CHANGE
Although he supports capping noneconomic damages, restricting
punitive damages, and reforming the collateral source rule, Professor
Sugarman is critical of those who urge legislators to enact such
changes without pressing for a more fundamental overhaul of the
tort system. Professor Sugarman advances a thought-provoking and
far reaching agenda of initiatives including temporary disability in-
surance, mandatory sick leave, and incentives for employer-financed
health benefits. While acknowledging his support for more conven-
tional reforms sought by "defense" advocates, he criticizes these ad-
vocates as reformers whose vision "is far too truncated. 48 Professor
Sugarman thus makes clear that any disagreement he might have
with the agenda advanced by these defense advocates centers on tac-
tical, rather than substantive, considerations.
Professor Sugarman's proposals for sweeping changes in the basic
tort and workers' compensation schemes, like those made by other
44. Barron, Forty Legislatures Act to Readjust Liability Rules, N.Y. Times, July
14, 1986, at 1, col. 1.
45. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.080 (1986); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111.5
(1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572H (1986); HAW. REV. STAT. § 663 (1936); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78.27-39 (1986).
46. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431 (West 1986).
47. See Laubach v. Morgan, 588 P.2d 1071 (Okla. 1978); Bartlett v. New Mexico
Welding Supply, Inc., 98 N.M. 152, 646 P.2d 579 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 98 N.M. 336,
648 P.2d 794 (1982).
48. Sugarman, supra note 2, at 804.
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academic advocates of no-fault and other regimes,49 certainly are
worthy of consideration. But until they are fleshed out further
through comprehensive research and debate, they offer little prospect
of short-term legislative change. Put simply, our disagreement with
Professor Sugarman centers on our divergent assessments of just
what is the realm of the possible. Professor Sugarman believes that
absent a push for radical change, states are unlikely to enact any
meaningful reforms. As advocates for tort reform in state legisla-
tures, the members of Lawyers for Civil Justice have been successful
in convincing legislators to make the kinds of meaningful changes5"
that Professor Sugarman predicts cannot be enacted.
Professor Sugarman's position as a law school professor affords
him the opportunity to take a longer view and consider the ramifica-
tions of changes that, if not feasible today, may be feasible a decade
from now. As entities on the firing line of the current tort system
today, the members of Lawyers for Civil Justice simply do not have
that luxury; they must instead concentrate efforts on that which can
be achieved in the short term.
The difference in approach is best illustrated by our divergence
from Professor Sugarman on the proper role of fault in the tort sys-
tem. Professor Sugarman would further restrict the role of fault as a
prerequisite for recovery. Indeed, he would even allow plaintiffs
whose own negligence contributed to their injuries to recover for in-
juries resulting from such contributory negligence.5 1 In the absence
of a demonstration that the more far reaching changes advocated by
Professor Sugarman are administratively and politically feasible,
Lawyers for Civil Justice advocates practical reforms to ensure that
strict liability theories do not limit consideration of fault to such an
extent as to convert strict liability into no-fault liability.
Until perhaps twenty years ago, fault was the central principle in
our tort system: a defendant could be held responsible only for his
own tortious acts. The emphasis on fault operated to place the cost
of harm on the wrongdoer rather than others in society and to deter
49. See, e.g., O'Connell, A "'Neo No-Fault" Contract In Lieu Of Tort: Preaccident
Guarantees of Postaccident Settlement Offers, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 898 (1985).
50. A March 1987 Justice Department survey of tort reform initiatives in state
legislatures reports that two-thirds of the states enacted tort reform legislation of some
kind during 1986 and many adopted important limits on joint and several liability,
noneconomic and punitive damages, and the collateral source rule. TORT POLICY WORK-
ING GROUP, AN UPDATE ON THE LIABILITY CRISIS 65-73 (1987).
51. Sugarman, supra note 2, at 839.
conduct that was likely to cause injuries to others.5 2
In recent years, courts have begun to shift away from fault-based
standards to legal principles that impose liability in the absence of
fault.5 3 The shift has been especially pronounced in cases involving
product design and warning issues. For example, in Beshada v.
Johns-Manville Products Corp.,54 the New Jersey Supreme Court
held that a manufacturer could be held liable for failure to warn of a
danger that was scientifically undiscoverable at the time of the prod-
uct's manufacture. The Beshada court defended this imposition of
liability in the absence of fault by arguing that manufacturers and
distributors could best allocate the costs of any injuries resulting
from their products.55 This approach, in effect, converts manufactur-
ers and distributors into accident insurers. 6
The tort system's drift toward liability without fault often results
in liability being imposed on defendants for conduct which was
neither improper nor wrongful. A no-fault regime removes the incen-
tive for manufacturers to increase the safety of their products since
it renders them equally liable whether they use reasonable care in
designing their products or not.57 Finally, liability without fault con-
tributes substantially to the unavailability of insurance and discour-
ages innovation by encouraging businesses to avoid risk. Accord-
ingly, there should be a return to standards of liability that include
consideration of fault, particularly in product liability cases.
There are a number of situations in which consideration of the
fault of the manufacturer would be appropriate. For example, if a
product deviates from the manufacturer's own specifications, it could
fairly be considered defective. And, where it is alleged that a product
was improperly designed, liability should be imposed only if the
manufacturer knew of the danger and failed to employ a reasonable
and practical design.
Perhaps the best example of the fairness of requiring proof of fault
is in matters involving the "state of the art" of product design. In
such cases, a manufacturer should be held liable for a failure to pro-
vide adequate warnings only if the manufacturer knew or should
have known, given the "state of the art" - that is, the level of perti-
nent scientific, technical and medical information - about the dan-
ger which allegedly caused the claimant's harm. Similarly, a manu-
52. W. P. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS 24-26 (5th ed. 1984).
53. DOJ REPORT, supra note 6, at 30-31.
54. 447 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982).
55. Id. at 547.
56. See S. REP. No. 670, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1982).
57. Robb, The Effect of the Proposed Federal Product Liability Act on Current
Law Regarding Liability for Defectively Designed Products, 6 J. PROD. LIAB. 147, 169
(1983).
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facturer should not be held liable for design or formulation of the
product if the product conformed to state of the art manufacturing
and engineering practices at the time the product left the manufac-
turer's control.58 Put simply, it is easy to say, after the fact, that a
manufacturer should have designed a product differently or provided
a warning of a risk that since has come to light. But when the risk
was unknown and no practical and technically feasible alternative
design was available when the product left the manufacturer's con-
trol, the manufacturer should not be subjected to liability.
Such reforms would not restore a traditional negligence standard
to product cases. Instead, they would establish a fault-based princi-
ple as an outer perimeter of strict liability. As respected legal schol-
ars have pointed out, absent such a limitation, product liability law
overreaches into the area of regulatory policy by empowering jurors
to impose liability on manufacturers if the jurors believe, notwith-
standing the manufacturer's having designed and labeled the product
in accordance with the state of the art, that the product lacked suffi-
cient social utility.5 9
The law should also recognize limited defenses to product liability
actions based on the claimant's own faulty conduct. For example, a
manufacturer should not be liable for harm resulting from an unrea-
sonable or unforeseeable use or alteration of the product. Similarly,
a manufacturer should incur no liability where injury results from a
defect or danger that would have been apparent to a reasonable per-
son or from an inherent characteristic of the product that would be
known to persons who ordinarily use or consume the product. Fi-
nally, a manufacturer should not be held liable if, at the time of
injury, the claimant was intoxicated or under the influence of a drug,
and that condition was fifty percent or more responsible for the event
that gave rise to the injury. These reforms will encourage product
users to take reasonable precautions and will act as strong incentives
to reduce accidents on the highways and at the work place.
Fault traditionally has been the linchpin of our tort system. It pro-
vides a standard by which well-intentioned people may conduct their
actions. By restoring fault as an outer perimeter of tort law, these
reforms will ensure that persons are not held liable for conduct that
58. See, e.g., Wiska v. St. Stanislaus Social Club, Inc., 7 Mass. App. Ct. 813, 390
N.E.2d 1133 (1979).
59. Product Liability, 1987: Hearings on H.B. 235 and S.B. 102 Before the Senate
Select Committee on Tort Reform of the Ohio Legislature, 117th Gen. Assembly (April
9, 1987) (statement of Victor E. Schwartz, Partner, Crowell & Moring; Adjunct Profes-
sor of Law, U. of Cinn.).
is otherwise proper and blameless.
CONCLUSION
Professor Sugarman's article should be recommended reading for
anyone not yet convinced of the unfairness and irrationality of the
current tort system. He argues convincingly that reforms are neces-
sary to restrict the runaway growth in punitive and noneconomic
damages and to revise the outmoded collateral source rule. He also
proffers a number of far-reaching proposals that should advance the
debate over how to reform the tort system but about which no con-
sensus yet exists.
Professor Sugarman's proposals, however, require more thought
and fleshing out before they will produce actual change. In the in-
terim, before far-reaching tort reform becomes a reality, concrete,
achievable reforms must be pursued. Most important, fault should
be restored to a central place in our tort system.
